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Theoretical resources for a globalised bioethics
Marian A Verkerk,1 Hilde Lindemann2
ABSTRACT
In an age of global capitalism, pandemics, far-flung
biobanks, multinational drug trials and telemedicine it is
impossible for bioethicists to ignore the global
dimensions of their field. However, if they are to do good
work on the issues that globalisation requires of them,
they need theoretical resources that are up to the task.
This paper identifies four distinct understandings of
‘globalised’ in the bioethics literature: (1) a focus on
global issues; (2) an attempt to develop a universal
ethical theory that can transcend cultural differences;
(3) an awareness of how bioethics itself has expanded,
with new centres and journals emerging in nearly every
corner of the globe; (4) a concern to avoid cultural
imperialism in encounters with other societies. Each of
these approaches to globalisation has some merit, as will
be shown. The difficulty with them is that the standard
theoretical tools on which they rely are not designed for
cross-cultural ethical reflection. As a result, they leave
important considerations hidden. A set of theoretical
resources is proposed to deal with the moral puzzles of
globalisation. Abandoning idealised moral theory,
a normative framework is developed that is sensitive
enough to account for differences without losing the
broader context in which ethical issues arise.
An empirically nourished, self-reflexive, socially
inquisitive, politically critical and inclusive ethics allows
bioethicists the flexibility they need to pick up on the
morally relevant particulars of this situation here without
losing sight of the broader cultural contexts in which it
all takes place.
In an age of global capitalism, pandemics, far-ﬂung
biobanks, multinational drug trials, telemedicine,
and international academic conferences, it is
impossible for bioethicists to ignore the global
dimensions of their ﬁeld.1e3 Consider, for example,
the ethical issues that arise in large-scale clinical
trials held in multiple sites around the globe. These
are typically sponsored by pharmaceutical compa-
nies with proprietary interests in the results, so
they do not often report negative ﬁndings: in
a recent review of 5000 studies identiﬁed as
potentially relevant, Hopewell and colleagues4
determined that only ﬁve included all ﬁndings.
Because the large number of unpublished studies
are likely to skew the published data, they present
both an epistemological and an ethical problem,
and this might be exacerbated if negative results are
more pronounced in one part of the world due to
some factor for which there was no control. How
should bioethicists think about this when, as
Rebecca Kukla points out in her talk, the death of
the author in contemporary biomedical research,
given at the Temple University School of Medicine
in 2009. The trials are so large that there is often no
principal investigator and indeed there may be no
one person who understands and can explain
everything that is going on in the trial? More
speciﬁcally, what theoretical resources do bioethi-
cists need if they are to tackle problems like these
effectively?
In their enormously inﬂuential ‘Principles of
biomedical ethics’, Tom Beauchamp and James F.
Childress5 promoted the use of four middle-level
principlesdautonomy, beneﬁcence, non-maleﬁcence
and justicedthat can be derived from almost any
conception of the good and the right and are said to
be applicable anywhere. According to the medical
sociologist Raymond De Vries and colleagues,6
principlism, as it is now called, remains by far the
most popular way to do bioethics in the USA. In
other Anglophone countries, utilitarianism, Kantian
ethics and human rights theoriesdall with claims to
universalitydare the preferred modes.
It might seem as if these approaches are just
what is needed for work at the global level. Surely
here if anywhere bioethicists need moral theory
that transcends cultural differences and offers
universalisable guidelines for action. In this paper,
however, weda Dutch bioethicist and her Amer-
ican colleaguedargue that this sort of theory is not
up to the task of reﬂective, critical and evaluative
analysis required in global contexts. To demonstrate
this, we identify four distinct understandings of
globalisation in the bioethics literature, examine
the theoretical assumptions that undergird them,
and show how each misses problems that are in
serious need of bioethical attention.
We then argue that a better way to deal with the
moral puzzles of globalisation is to develop
a normative framework that is sensitive enough to
register morally relevant differences among us
instead of vainly attempting to transcend them. At
the same time, it must keep a sharp eye on the
political and social networks in which people are
differently enmeshed. An empirically nourished, self-
reﬂexive, socially inquisitive, politically critical and
inclusive ethics, we submit, allows bioethicists the
ﬂexibility they need to pick up on the particulars of
this situation here without losing sight of the
broader cultural contexts in which it all takes place.
FOUR MEANINGS OF GLOBALISATION
In the bioethics literature, ‘globalisation’ is under-
stood in at least these four ways:
1. A focus on global issues, such as unjust
distributions of health care between the global
north and south. Norman Daniels,7 for example,
has argued that for decades, bioethics has been
ﬁxated on the dyadic doctorepatient relation-
ship and the ethical signiﬁcance of exotic
medical technologies, all the while ignoring






Michigan State University, East
Lansing, Michigan, USA
Correspondence to
Dr Marian A Verkerk, University
Medical Center Groningen,
University of Groningen, Postbus
30001, 9700 RB Groningen, The
Netherlands;
m.a.verkerk@med.umcg.nl
Received 21 March 2010
Revised 27 August 2010
Accepted 17 September 2010
Published Online First
25 November 2010
92 J Med Ethics 2011;37:92e96. doi:10.1136/jme.2010.036830
Ethics
His remedy is to focus on questions of equity, such as
intergenerational equity in the context of societal ageing,
health disparities among different social groups and unequal
distributions of health care on an international scale.
2. An attempt to develop a universal ethical theory that can
transcend cultural differences. Peter Singer and colleagues,8
for instance, offer a rationale for a global health ethics
grounded in utilitarianismda theory whose rules of duty
aspire, as Henry Sidgwick9 aptly put it, to ‘precise deﬁnition
in universal form’. Similarly, Thomas Pogge10 lays out
a research programme for a globalised bioethics based on
a normative framework of universal human rights.
3. An awareness of how bioethics itself has expanded across the
globe. Sirkku Hellsten11 notes that the interactions among
the diverse scholarly communities in the world amounts to
a globalisation of the ﬁeld of bioethics in general. Mark
Aulisio12 likewise comments that ‘bioethics has become
a citizen of the global village’, with new centres, depart-
ments, organisations and journals emerging in nearly every
corner of the globe. In addition to the International
Association of Bioethics and the International Network on
Feminist Approaches to Bioethics, there are now numerous
international, national, regional and local bioethics centres
connected to each other by research partnerships and other
forms of collaboration. Bioethics is so well established
globally that it has found its way to WHO and the United
Nations.
4. A concern to avoid cultural imperialism in encounters with
other societies. Feminist bioethicists in North America, the
UK and Australia in particular have called for a greater
sensitivity to differences among cultures. According to Alison
Jaggar,13 as globalisation increasingly draws non-western
cultures into its net, there is a danger that these cultures will
be exploited by powerful western interests. Françoise Baylis,
Susan Sherwin, Heather Widdows, Donna Dickinson, and
others have argued that the imposition of western-style
abstract, individualistic, universalist ethical norms on people
to whom these concepts are foreign is a form of oppression
that bioethicists should resist.14 15
Each of these approaches to globalisation has some merit, as
we shall show, but because the theoretical tools they employ are
not, by and large, designed for cross-cultural ethical reﬂection,
they leave important considerations hidden.
We begin with the focus on global issues. Daniels7 is to be
commended for turning his attention to problems of global-
isation, but because he has adopted a Rawlsian theoretical
framework, he concentrates on issues of global distributive
justice. While these are important and indeed pressing, a single-
minded focus on the distribution of goods and services, as Iris
Marion Young16 has argued, misses the powerful social forces
that produce inequities of distribution in the ﬁrst place. More-
over, other staples of bioethical concern are also affected by
globalisation. For instance, globalising technologies such as the
internet and email make telecare possible, and this has
a profound effect on the doctorepatient relationship.17 Simi-
larly, the globalised nature of research on the human genome
raises questions about cultural identities, exploitative investi-
gative practices, and other ethical issues that do not ﬁt under the
rubric of distributive justice. Research ethics, as we indicated
earlier, takes on many new dimensions in a globalised academic
economy.
The attempt to develop a universal ethical theory can be
applauded for the impulse that motivates it, namely, to do the
work of reﬂection and justiﬁcation in as unbiased a manner as
possible. Here again, however, we focus on what it leaves out.
For one thing, the language of principles, rights, utilities and
duties sits uneasily in the company of intimate human rela-
tionships such as love, family and friendship.18 It fares little
better in the domain of social group relations, especially when
these are abusive power relations. Moreover, moral theories
that universalise by ﬂattening out differences among moral
actors are likely to overlook important players and so deprive
them of their due.
To see that problem more clearly, let us return to our telecare
example. Telecare can be a boon to the frail elderly because it
allows them to remain at home, where they can enjoy greater
independence and the comfort of familiar surroundings. On
a principlist approach within a universal ethical framework it
can therefore be ethically justiﬁed on the grounds of respect for
patient autonomy. However, such a framework idealises ‘the’
moral actordhere, the elderly persondas dependent on no one
but himself and unencumbered by ties to others. This renders
invisible the real-time, non-ideal family caregivers whose work is
generally required to sustain the elderly person’s autonomy and
keep him independent. (That the universal framework is totally
silent about the gender identity of these invisible caregivers goes
without saying.)
On a principlist approach, to be sure, one could weigh the
principle of autonomy against the principle of justice and decide
that telecare courts the danger of exploiting the home caregivers.
But because, like other standard moral approaches, principlism is
heavily individualistic, it does not make it easy for the moral
deliberator to see the patient as nested in a web of intimate
relationships that sustain her care. It is not that principlism
makes it impossible to see the moral situation in that waydit is
just that it does not make it easy. The philosopher Cheshire
Calhoun19 calls theoretical biases of this kind ‘ideologies of the
moral life’, and bids us to ‘ask what ideologies of the moral life
are likely to result from the repeated inclusion or exclusion of
particular topics in moral theorising’. What is needed here,
instead of the assumption of an idealised moral agent whose
choices are guided by four universalisable principles, is an ethical
analysis that tracks actual assignments of responsibility and
incorporates the perspectives of all parties to a given moral
situation.
That bioethics itself has expanded across the globe has been
explained by appealing to its unbounded nature. As Aulisio12
observes, ‘Many of its core issues cut across traditional bound-
aries, be they disciplinary, cultural, religious, national or inter-
national.’ The perspectives of non-western bioethicists are
generally welcomed as valuable not only because they enrich the
standard bioethical debates, but also because they draw atten-
tion to the multicultural aspects of US, British, Canadian and
European societies themselves. Here too, however, something is
left out. The enrichment in question typically comes down to an
appreciation of how ill-suited an autonomy-based or conse-
quentialist, individualist ethics is to reﬂecting on situations
involving people with deeply held communal values. This
observation is often accompanied by reminders that western
notions of the self are not universally shared.20 We think
a different kind of reﬂection is needed. In the international
research partnerships and cross-cultural collaborations that now
more than ever characterise bioethics, we call for bioethicists to
be self-reﬂective, paying careful attention to their own social
location and its attendant assumptions and perquisites. This
kind of critical reﬂection might prompt the thought that
bioethicists too are raced and classed, dependent on others for
long stretches of their lives, and blinkered by the sight lines that
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attend all human points of view. Such reﬂection in turn might
make it easier to resist the temptation to picture the bioethicist
as somehow hovering above the fray, rendering moral judge-
ments from an unspeciﬁed epistemic position external to that of
the actors in the instant case.
The concern to avoid cultural imperialism is particularly
important, given the sorry tradition of colonialism, whose
effects continue to cause suffering not only in the global south
but among indigenous and formerly enslaved people in the north
as well.13 In bioethics, the non-idealised feminist theory, critical
race theory and colonial studies that have provided the basis for
this approach to globalisation have largely been promoted by
feminists. Their theoretical resources capture more of the
differences among people and the social networks that connect
them than do the impartialist, individualistic, universal theories
that inform the other three approaches. Even here, however,
something is left out. Although feminists have subjected their
own theories to rigorous criticism, they have not always been
careful to locate themselves within the moral situations that are
the object of their reﬂections.
Moreover, when they contest a dominant group’s view of
who must do what, they have not always been careful to
explain what kind of authority their alternative view of the
matter possesses. For example, in an article on cross-cultural
determinations of child abuse and neglect, Françoise Baylis and
Jocelyn Downie21 discuss a traditional Laotian healing technique
for the Mien folk illness of Ghusia mun toe, which involves
a mother ’s burning a reed dipped in pork fat and passing it
across her baby ’s abdomen. They argue that this tradition
must be respected, but not if it raises blisters: when a cultural
practice subjects a child to harm, ‘the dominant community ’s
beliefs and values should prevail’. Nowhere in the article,
however, do they explain why the dominant community ’s
medically imposed injuries are morally acceptable, while the
injuries of other cultures are ruled out of court. Nor, for that
matter, do they explain whose court it is or where it gets its
legitimacy.
A NATURALISED, PARTICULARISTIC, GLOBAL BIOETHICS
We accept Margaret Walker ’s22 argument for an ethics that is
empirically nourished but also acutely aware that ethical theory
is the practice of particular people in particular times, places,
cultures and professional environments. The bioethics we
favour is naturalised, but it does not privilege knowledge
produced by institutionally organised hard and soft science.
Many kinds of knowledge, some of it local or narrative or
experiential, and all of it socially situated, enter into its delib-
erations. A naturalised bioethics, then, is wary of idealisations
that bypass social realities (‘all moral agents have a rational life
plan’). It is equally suspicious of purely ‘reﬂective’ approaches to
ethics that are apt to reﬂect only somedusually the most
socially privilegeddmoral points of view.23
A particularistic ethics notices that the social fabric is
permeated with morality; moral understandings are always
socially embedded. For that reason, a particularistic global
bioethics pays close attention to the particular social setting in
which a puzzling moral issue has arisen, but because it situates
people in relational networks of shared understandings it also
pays attention to the broader context. When enough under-
standings are in fact shared between you and us, we can speak of
a moral community; when you and we cannot make enough
sense of each other even to disagree, there is no community at
all. Even then we might have responsibilities to youdor your
descendantsddepending on how vulnerable you are to what we
do. Because of our global connections, there is an ongoing
intertwinement of responsibilities.
A naturalised, particularistic global bioethics sees morality as
a set of social practices. On this view, morality is not a branch of
knowledge (although all sorts of knowledge are needed to
participate in it). It is, rather, something we do together. It
consists in taking, sharing, deﬂecting, or assuming responsibility
for different thingsdand these practices of responsibility both
allow and require people to see themselves and their relation-
ships as deﬁned by particular moral values. The bioethicist’s role
(we follow Walker22 here) is to analyse and reﬂect upon this
practice in at least three ways:
1. Reﬂective analysis sets itself the task of examining the
socially shared moral understandings that sustain actual
practices of responsibility and ascertaining how these
understandings work. This requires a familiarity with social
positions other than the ethicist’s own, because from some of
those positions, certain understandings might make
a different kind of sense, or no sense at all. The bioethicist
must therefore acquire all the information she can get about
the various forms that morality takes in different neighbour-
hoods of a particular moral community. If she wants to work
cross-culturally, as we two do on a fairly regular basis, she
needs to be continually aware that the things she takes for
granted might not be at all the same in a culture that is
foreign to her.
2. Critical reﬂection asks whether the socially shared moral
understandings under examination really are shared by all
those who enact them, and whether they are equally
intelligible to all. What allows those understandings to
operate properly? Do certain unsavoury aspects have to be
concealed? Do some people have to be manipulated or
coerced? This kind of reﬂection aims to determine whether
the moral arrangements can account for themselves morally,
in their own terms, which means that the bioethicist must
have knowledge of not only the actual practices of
responsibility but also its participants’ conceptions of them.
While reﬂective analysis is descriptive, critical reﬂection is
normative, in that it holds moral relations and understand-
ings to moral standards: if purportedly moral interactions are
in fact based on manipulation or brute force, they are not
moral ones, even though they appear to be.
3. Finally, normative reﬂection is the attempt to determine
whether a particular way of life is good for people in the
particular historical, cultural and material set of circumstance
in which they live. It rejects idealisations that do not capture
what any particular people are doing at a given place and
time. It also denies the existence of any superior perspective
to which we could appeal to assess critically the culture we
inhabit. It insists that there are moral facts of the matter,
although it is deeply sceptical of attempts to locate them
outside any actual moral communities. It takes advantage of
the space of moral reﬂection in which the question about
morality ’s authority is raised. Just as that space contains
moral vocabulary for asking that question, so too does it
contain the moral ideas and standards that must be involved
in answering it. The answer will be comparative, a matter of
trying to ﬁnd out whether some ways of living really are
better than others.
HOW THE BIOETHICIST MIGHT PROCEED
On this naturalised and particularistic view of morality, how
might the bioethicist think about, for example, the role of
informed consent in globalised health? Because the model is
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collaborative, she does not sit alone in her room and conduct
artiﬁcial thought experiments that result in moral judgements.
Instead, she works together with the participants involved in an
actual situation in which informed consent seems to be needed.
In any global context, these participants will very likely speak
different languages, and language barriers are quite difﬁcult to
overcome. There is no easy solution to this problem: it takes
a willingness on all sides to learn as much as possible of the
others’ languages, not only for purposes of facilitating commu-
nication, but also because initiation into a language constitutes
initiation into a culture. To acquire a language is to acquire
patterns of thought, a sense of what strikes its speakers as funny
and what is taken for granted. A common language such as
English is very helpful, but native English speakers in particular
must work hard to learn the language of their interlocutors, for
that is the best way of getting to know their culture.
Once the bioethicist has acquired at least a rudimentary
understanding of the language of those with whom she collabo-
rates, she encourages them to start with reﬂective analysis:
the participants generate a description of the various assignments
of responsibility that operate in their situation, along with the
moral understandings that undergird them. As the bioethicist and
participants critically reﬂect on these understandingsdespecially
when they track the identiﬁed responsibilitiesdthe bioethicist
might ask the participants to be alert to unjust imbalances of
power, manipulation, or even force. In normative reﬂection, the
group proceeds by comparison, weighing the merits of different
ways of proceeding they know about or can imagine. They draw
on their shared moral understandings as they try to decide which
course of action would be better than others.
MORAL REFLECTION FOR A GLOBALISED BIOETHICS
Globalising a naturalised, particularistic bioethics underscores the
importance of dealing with two ethical questions (see table 1):
1. The question of moral responsibility: to whom am I (are we)
morally responsible? Because a naturalised global bioethics
views morality as consisting of relations of recognition and
responsibility, more attention must be paid to such issues
such as:
(a) global distributive justice (allocation of scarce medical
resources)
(b) intergenerational justice (conservation, sustainability)
(c) intragenerational responsibility (biobanks)
(d) intertwinement of responsibilities (research ethics).
Mapping responsibilities in global settings involves
paying attention to different social positions (including
our own as ethicists), gathering all kinds of information
(including information about how responsibilities are
assigned and who is accountable to whom), thinking
carefully about who is vulnerable when the assignments
are made in that way, and trying to ﬁnd out what
authority the moral understandings that operate in that
context have. In principle, every moral issue should be
addressed from this relational perspective.
2. The question of moral justiﬁcation: to whom am I (are we)
morally accountable? In a way this question is intertwined
with the ﬁrst one. In recognising the other as someone to
whom I bear responsibility, I recognise that person as
someone to whom I am accountable. Whether the original
assignment of responsibility is morally justiﬁed can only be
decided by using the resources within existing practices of
responsibility, but because these assignments are often
epistemically rigged to appear innocent when in fact they
are not, justiﬁcation seeks transparency in moral life.22 Sabina
Lovibond24 invokes this ideal in her conception of ‘a
community whose members understood their own form of
life and yet were not embarrassed by it’.
CONCLUSION
At ﬁrst glance, it might look as if we are espousing a kind of
ethical relativism. Because a particularistic, naturalised bioethics
understands morality as an interpersonal practice arising out of
what goes on between or among people, it might be thought
that morality is merely a social construction, with no authority
apart from whatever people happen to give it. In our view,
though, there is nothing ‘mere’ about a social construction.
Social constructions are real, and they have a real impact on
people’s wellbeing. Indeed, people themselves are essentially
social constructions, initially shaped through their interactions
with their parents and the others in their community who give
them their second natures, and then held in personhood through
the patterns of recognition and response that constitute their
lives together. To ask why we should submit to the moral norms
on offer in our particular social world is to ask why we should
let our lives be regulated by the very practices and institutions
without which we would not have any selves at all.
To be sure, we need not submit to all the moral norms oper-
ative in our society. Any system of morality (as opposed to raw
power) contains resources for criticising and contesting norms
that are cruel, dismissive of certain kinds of people, or exploit-
ative. We do not, then, subscribe to the idea that whatever
a given society says is right and wrong is in fact what is right
and wrong in that society, but we are sceptical of the existence
of transcendental moral standards against which socially shared
moral understandings could be measured.
We do not deny that some moral principles (‘Do not torture
the innocent’, ‘Murder is wrong’) have universal scope. We
merely deny that socially and temporally transcendent moral
standards could possibly help us determine what such principles
might mean in a given situation. If these standards truly stand
outside society, they cannot engage what goes on inside it, nor
would we have epistemic access to them. Our plight is some-
thing more like that of Otto Neurath’s famous mariners: moral
knowledge is like a raft at sea that we continually rebuild while
staying aﬂoat on it.25
A ﬁnal point. It might be thought that, in rejecting a certain
kind of normative theory, we are rejecting moral theorising tout
court. We are not. The resources we offerdreconceptualising
morality as an interpersonal, collaborative practice; moral
particularism; reﬂective analysis; critical and normative reﬂec-
tiondare fully theoretical. Because they part company with the
moral theories that have dominated western culture for the past
several hundred years, they have somewhat misleadingly been
dubbed antitheory. We hope they are not that. Theory is vital to
any sound practice, perhaps especially the practice of morality.
Our aim in this paper has been, rather, to replace what we see
as inapt, ill-ﬁtting theory with something that better suits
a globalised bioethics.
Table 1 Responsibility and justification
Reflective analysis
(descriptive)
Tracking responsibilities: who is responsible for what?
Who is accountable to whom? What moral understandings
are at play in the situation?
Critical reflection
(normative)
Does everyone share the operative moral understandings?
Are they justifiable in their own moral terms? Do they serve
only the interests of the powerful?
Normative reflection
(normative)
Where do the shared understandings get their legitimacy?
Do we know, or can we imagine, more morally sound
ways to proceed?
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